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....
who can explain why an individual who is anesthetized [during
an operation] should be charged with knowledge that his surgeon
failed to remove an object which he had placed in the incision? In
fact, who can explain why a person should be charged with knowledge of anything that is unknown or unknowable?

It is illogical and unjust to bar a claim because a person did not
discover a wrong which is of its very nature "inherently unknowable," 53
such as a sponge closed in an incision. The rejection of the wrongful act
rule by the court in the instant case was a choice between the jeopardy
which practitioners may face in defending old claims and affording a
claimant an opportunity for a day in court. In choosing the latter, Monrooted in the basic
tana has adopted a modern minority rule which is '54
legal maxim: "For every wrong there is a remedy.
EARL J. HANSON.

John
SEARCH OF BODILY CAvITIES.-Defendants
AND SEIZURE:
Blefare and Donald Michel were convicted in federal district court of
smuggling heroin. They had been stopped and searched by Customs
agents, who had reliable information that the defendants were coming
across the border from Mexico with heroin in their stomachs. The heroin
was recovered from Blefare by restraining him sufficiently to pass a tube
through his nose and into his stomach to allow the introduction of an
emetic. The two packets of heroin thus recovered were received in evidence over the objection of defendants. On appeal to federal circuit
court, defendants claimed the method of obtaining the heroin was violative of their Federal Constitutional rights and the packets should not
have been admitted into evidence. Held: Convictions affirmed. The procedure used to obtain the packets was not unreasonable, and did not
violate "due process." Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1966).
SEARCH

In affirming the reasonableness of the search the majority cites no
specific standards, but rather confines itself to an analysis of the facts.
The concurring opinion helpfully points out in a footnote that the court
was applying the standard of reasonableness first laid down in Boyd v.
5

3The phrase "inherently unknowable" harm was first used by Justice Rutledge in
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949) in reference to the time of discovery
of the disease of silicosis as covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act. Justice
Rutledge in rejecting the wrongful act rule, stated:
[m]echanical analysis of the accrual of petitioner's injury-whether
breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the
disease-can only serve to thwart the congressional purpose . . . . It
would mean that at some past moment in tife, unknown and inherently
unknowable even in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge . . ..
there is a remedy."
wrong1966
provides:
"Forof every
§ 49-115 at
-R.C.M.
Published
by 1947,
ScholarWorks
University
Montana,

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 28 [1966], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

United States' as it has been interpreted by subsequent decisions such as
Mapp v. Ohio,2 and Ker v. California.3
Boyd v. United States purportedly established constitutional standards of reasonableness in the area of federal search and seizure. 4 An
analysis of Boyd and subsequent Fourth Amendment decisions reveals
that the constitutional standard of reasonableness is fairly rigid in its
formulation, but unusually flexible in its application. 5 A legal search
may be made for an object subject to forfeiture if a valid warrant is
issued for its seizure, or if the search is made incident to a lawful arrest.6
If these criteria are fulfilled and the seizure is made within the scope of
the authority thus granted, the seizure is reasonable. 7 A failure to fulfill
these criteria makes the search unreasonable.8 However, the definitional
elements of the standard are not fixed. Thus in the individual case there
is a question as to whether the elements of the standard apply to the
'116 U.S. 616, (1886).
The majority opinion in the Boyd case is one of those curious documents
the whole of which is much superior to the sum of its parts. While the
decision has exerted an enormous influence on the entire subsequent course
of the Fourth Amendment's interpretation, some of Bradley's reasoning
fails to stand up under close scrutiny. . . . [R]are indeed is the search
opinion to which the Boyd case is relevant which does not cite it as
precedent.

2367

LANDYNSKI,

SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE

AND
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SUPREME

COURT

56,57 (1966).
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. 643 (1961).

'374
U.S. 23 (1963).
4
Professor Wigmore claims that while the decision in Boyd was correct on the basis
of the Fifth Amediment, it came to two fallacious conclusions: first, holding that
compulsory production of the papers involved constituted search and seizure; and
second, holding that the admission of such papers as evidence was "unconstitutional."
In doing this Wigmore claims that the Court violated a fundamental principle of
evidence. That is: "A judge does not attempt, in the course of a specific litigation,
to investigate and punish all offenses which incidentally cross the path of that
litigation." 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2184a, 2183 at 6,7 (MeNaughton rev. 1961).
5See especially, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and Ker v. California,
supra note 3.
OA search warrant must particularly describe the item, and it must describe something
which the government has a right to because it is the friut of a crime, or related item.
The warrant cannot describe mere evidence. Boyd v. United States, supra note 1.
If the search is made incident to an arrest, then the scope is extended to greater
limits, and mere evidence may be seized. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that search warrants were
in familiar use when the Constitution was adopted and, plainly, that when
issued ''upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized," searches, and seizures made under them, are to be regarded as
not unreasonable, and therefor not prohibited by the Amendment. Gouled
v. United States, supra note 5, at 308.
However there is no indication in the instant case that the search was incident
to an arrest, or that a search warrant was issued. In Rivas v. United States, No.
20,556, 9th Cir., November 8, 1966, a later Ninth Circuit decision by the concurring
judge in the instant case, Barnes, J., concluded: "The United States Government
has an absolute right to a border search and no probable cause is necessary.''
There is tentative support for such a special border rule in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). See also Boyd v. United States, supra note 1, at 623.
7United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 6, at 61.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss1/7
2
'Gouled v. United States, supra note 5, at 308.
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facts. As noted in Ker the standard is "not susceptible of Procrustean
application." 9
The court in the instant case separates its analysis of reasonableness
as dictated by the Fourth Amendment from its consideration of the
claim that appellants were denied due process of law. Without stating
explicit standards the majority rejects appellants' contention that they
had been denied due process of law. However, the failure to announce
specific standards is not surprising since the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area have been consistently vague. The Supreme Court
has said that while the standard "precludes defining" that the "vague
contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large." 10
In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, due process is a guarantee of respect for those personal rights and immunities which are "so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda12
mental"" and as such, are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'
In the area of search and seizure, as well as other areas, the Court
has intentionally avoided defining or limiting due process.1 3 However
a piecemeal application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment has given some specific content to the concept
of due process. Specifically, in Nat. Safe Dep. Co. v. Illinois,14 it was held
that unreasonable search and seizure by state officials was not barred by
the Constitution since the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states.
However, in 1949, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado'5 held that the "security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment" was required by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6 The Court did not apply the exclusionary rule to the states, although it had been applied in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment on the federal level.' 7 In 1961, Wolf
was overruled on this latter point, and in Mapp v. Ohio' s it was held
that evidence gathered in an unreasonable search and seizure was to be
excluded from state as well as federal courts. Ker v. Californiaheld that
it would be the federal standard of reasonableness which would be applied to the states, and that this was the constitutional standard. 19
OKer v. California,supra note 3, at 33.
"'Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
''Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . . " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
"Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
12Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
"Rochin v. California,supra note 10, at 171.
1232 U.S. 58 (1914).
-338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Id. at 27-28.
"Ibid.; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
'Supra note 2, at 654-55.
"Supraby
note
3.
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Between the Wolf and Mapp decisions due process was given an additional interpretation in Rochin v. California.20 There, state officers, without the legal authority of a warrant, invaded the privacy of Rochin's
home after receiving a tip that he was a narcotics dealer. The officers
then broke into his bedroom where they saw two capsules on a nightstand. When the defendant put these into his mouth, the officers jumped
him in an effort to remove the drugs. When this failed, the removal was
accomplished by the use of a stomach pump similar to the one used in
the instant case. At the trial the capsules, containing morphine, were
received into evidence. Rochin's subsequent conviction was reversed by
the Supreme Court. Although it was clearly a search and seizure question, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion without mentioning the Wolf decision, which he had authored three years before. He
stated that the petitioner had been denied due process of law because
the police conduct had offended "those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English speaking people toward
those charged with even the most heinous offenses. '' 2 1 In other words it
was conduct which "shocked the conscience."
Thus the court in Blefare faced possibly two different criteria for
judging the agents' conduct: Was the search and seizure unreasonable?
Did the conduct of the agents deny the petitioners due process of law?
Since it is not clear whether or not they proscribe the same conduct, the
court considered both.
Although the majority opinion in Blefare did not specifically cite
22
Boyd it appears to have applied the federal standard of reasonableness.
The district court had held that the criteria for a reasonable search and
seizure had been fulfilled. In upholding this finding the circuit court
noted that where an international border is crossed, mere suspicion has
been held sufficient cause for search. 23 The agents here knew that Blefare
had smuggled dope in his stomach before, and had information that he
was in Mexico planning to do it again. 24 The hereoin, as contraband, was
subject to seizure. 2 5 Thus the agents had the legal right to seize the
packets when Blefare reached the border.2 6 The circuit court went on to
point out that apparently every reasonable alternative, consistent with
2
the recovery of the heroin, had been tried before the use of the tube.
2'Supra note 10.
aBochin v. California,supra note 10, at 169, quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 416-17 (1945).
'This is confirmed by the concurring judge. Instant case at 876-77.
2Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959); See also supra note 6.
21Instant case at 871. The information was obtained from other Customs agents and
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who had somehow personally obtained it from
Blef are.
OBoyd v. United States, supra note 1. See also supra note 6.
OCervantes v. United States, supra note 23.
'The use by the police of a reasonable method of search, as such, does not appear to
be required by the Fourth Amendment. See McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95
(1927); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-53 (1952). Cf. United States v.
Babinowitz) supra note 6. A reasonable search of the body may be required by due
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss1/7
4
process. Roehin v. California,supra note 10.
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Under these circumstances the search and the seizure of the heroin
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The finding that the search was legal was also used to distinguish
the conduct here from the standard of due process established in Rochin.
The majority in Blefare claimed it was the entire sequence of events in
Rochin which "shocked the conscience" of the Supreme Court.28 The majority implies that since the original entry in Rochin was unlawful, that
each of the subsequent events was thereby made unreasonable. 29 Since
the police had no legal authority, there was no justification for use of
any force, and thus their conduct became in toto a violation of the defendant's right to due process of the law. In the instant case the element
of brutality, which appears to be part of the Rochin standard, was of no
consequence because the original search was lawful.30
Judge Ely, in his dissent, stated that the standards of the Rochin
decision had been violated. "The search procedure which my Brothers
condone was, if not savage, so repugnant to the provisions of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments as to offend my judicial sensibility." 3' He notes
the procedure was so revolting that one of the Customs agents suffered
32
an attack of nausea and was forced to leave the search room.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as
of the date of the instant case would appear to uphold the seizure of
drugs in the manner employed by these agents. Further, it seems probable that surgery to recover narcotics concealed within the body would
be constitutionally permissible. 33 On the other hand, the Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona,3 4 decided after Blefare, held the creation of even
a coercive atmosphere during a police interrogation violated the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The paradox which is
thereby brought to light may best be framed in the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of
constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order
'The court quotes the facts from Bochin: "Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents--this course of proceeding by agents of government is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities." Instant case at 875.
"Commenting on Bochin the court notes: "In furtherance of their illegal entry and
search they then took him to a hospital where an emetic was forced into his stomach.''
Instant case at 875.
11,'Here a border search was in progress. The officers had every right to search for
contraband. They had knowledge from which they were entitled to conclude that
narcotics were present in the stomach [sic] of the two suspects."
Instant case at
876.
"Instant case at 880.
8Ibid.
0Judge Barnes, who concurred in the instant case, referred to the taking of a blood
sample as a "surgical procedure." Instant case at 876. Such a "search"
has been
upheld by the Supreme Court. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Schmerber
v. California, 86*Sup. Ct. 1826 (1966).
Published
by ScholarWorks
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to convict a man the police cannot extract by3 5 force what is in his
mind but can extract what is in his stomach.

A partial answer to this paradox was recently hinted at by the
Supreme
different
extended
orthodox

Court. In Schmerber v. California6 the court implied that a
standard of reasonableness might be used where the search is
beneath the surface of the body. Although in Schmerber the
standard was used, the Court warned:

That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions
in no way indicates that it permits
3 7 more substantial intrusions, or
intrusions under other conditions.
As indicated in Schmerber the traditional Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness, which if fulfilled give an absolute right to seize,
do not appear adequate where there is a medical search of the body. If
such a search is to be permitted at all, it is submitted that due process
of law demands more stringent criteria than the permissive standards laid
down by the instant case. A medical search involves not only an invasion
of privacy, but also a serious invasion of personal dignity coexistent with
38
the potential of bodily harm or death.
If the Rochin standard is similar to the one applied by the dissenting
judge then due process of law requires more than just an incorporation
of Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. However the history of due process is one of flexible application. 9 The language of the
Rochin decision itself indicates this:
To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by
freezing "due process of law" at some fixed stage of time or thought
is to suggset that the most important aspect of Constitutional
adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges,
for whom the independence safeguarded by Article III of the Constitution was designed and who 4are
presumably guided by established
0
standards of judicial behavior.
The Court in Rochin was shocked because the conduct was brutal. It
is submitted that the conduct here was equally brutal and equally
'Bochin v. California, supra note 10, at 173.
'Supra note 33, at 1835. The Court discusses the scope of an external search and then
comments: ''Whatever the validity of these considerations in general, they have little

applicability with respect to searches beyond the body's surface."
'Supra note 33, at 1836.
mSuch invasions were apparent here. The procedure for introducing a "stomach tube'
such as used here is as follows:
The catheter should be lubricated with mineral oil and gently introduced
through the nose; when the pharnyx is reached the patient is given a
glass of water and a straw and instructed to swallow. The tube can be
inserted without difficulty while the patient swallows the water. After
the tube has reached the stomach a syringe is attached and the gastric
contents are aspirated." CHRISTOPHER, TEXTBOOK OF SURGERY 1593 (2nd
ed. 1939).

Where all witnesses agree that Blefare struggled violently and was forcibly restrained
by at least three agents, (Instant case at 882), could there have been either a safe
procedure, or one where the defendant would be allowed to maintain any dignity?
"See, Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MIcH. L. REv. 737 (1922).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss1/7
6
"BRochin v. California, supra note 10, at 171.
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capable of "brutalizing the temper of society." However a standard
couched in terms of brutality appears to be a poor one. In most instances
its application would depend on the conduct initiated by the subject
rather than the police. Protection would be afforded primarily to those
who resisted. A better standard would appear to be based on a balancing
of the interests involved. Society's reason for the search should be balanced against the potential invasion of privacy and other risks to the individual searched. 41 Such criteria should be in addition to, and not a
substitution for, traditional Fourth Amendment standards.
It is recognized that any such expansion of personal rights probably would involve the freeing of some obviously guilty individuals.
However, the standard thus laid down would provide criteria regulating
police conduct toward the innocent as well as the guilty. It is important
that the criminal element of society be controlled, but in the words of
F. B. I. Director J. Edgar Hoover:
Law enforcement, however, in defeating the criminal, must maintain
inviolate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the
criminal, yet, by so doing,42 destroy the dignity of the individual,
would be a hollow victory.
JAMES POORE.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION:
VIDING THAT THERE Is

STEPCHILD MAY INHERIT UNDER A STATUTE PRO-

No DISTINCTION BETWEEN KINDRED OF THE WHOLE

AND HALF BLoOD.-William F. Humphrey died intestate, leaving as sur-

vivors his two brothers, several children of deceased brothers, and a
stepdaughter who was the natural daughter by a former marriage of his
deceased wife. When a nephew was appointed administrator of the
estate, the stepdaughter filed a cross-petition to revoke the letters of
administration and establish herself as administratrix. On motion to dismiss the cross-petition, held, denied. Under a statute eliminating the
common law distinction between kindred of the whole and half blood,
a stepchild may inherit from a stepparent who dies intestate. In re Estate
of Humphrey, 254 F. Supp. 33 (D. D. C. 1966).1
"Recently the Supreme Court applied a similar test in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). There the Court found the possibility that the law would allow
police to search the marital bedroom for signs of the use of contraceptives to be
repulsive to our notions of privacy, and hence, held the Connecticut contraceptive law
unconstitutional. Perhaps the drug laws should be examined with similar considerations in mind by both the Court and the Congress.
"Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 IOwA L. REV.
175, 177 (1952).
'A "stepchild'' is the son or daughter of one's wife by a former husband, or of one's
husband by a former wife. In re Estate of Smith, 49 Wash.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550, 63
A.L.R.2d 299 (1956). "Half blood" is a term denoting the degree of relationship
which
between those
who haveofthe
same father
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